Our contribution in this chapter is to address the argument made by philosopher Samuel Freeman (2001) that libertarianism is not a liberal view. Freeman's argument is based on the claim that full alienability of property rights is antithetical to liberal political institutions. We address Freeman's argument by arguing twofold. First, although he derives a logically valid theory of libertarianism, which indeed has illiberal implications, Freeman's account of libertarianism mistakenly conflates an absolute notion of private property and contract with liberty itself. Second, we argue that private property and freedom of contract are necessary, but not sufficient for a liberal view of libertarianism. Sufficient for a liberal view of libertarianism is a framework of general and universally applicable rules that exhibit neither discrimination nor dominion over individuals before the law, i.e. liberty. The right to private property and contract are normatively laden principles, yet contextual and endogenous to a political framework that gives space to exchange and human flourishing. Ultimately, what Freeman is criticizing is an illiberal view of libertarianism that structures atomistic interaction, one where human interaction is passively based on a logical derivation of the non-aggression axiom. Our account is that libertarianism, properly understood, is a liberal view that structures social interaction, one where human interaction is open-ended and exchange is initiated by individuals' purposive plans. 
I. Introduction
The unifying aim of modern political theory, and liberalism in particular, has been its attempt to discover solutions to the problem of securing peaceful cooperation amongst individuals pursuing diverse plans and goals without engaging in violent conflict with one other. This is, we argue, an institutional problem in need of an institutional solution. Liberalism as a political theory has attempted to resolve this problem by establishing clear social boundary rules and historically this entailed restricting the role of the state to securing individuals' rights. As Rasmussen and Den Uyl state, "the language of rights is the language of liberalism, and liberals " (2005: 76) For libertarian readers it seems almost natural to dismiss Freeman out of hand as an exercise built on a combination of uncharitable reading, strawman arguments, and leaps of logic.
But this, we argue, would be the wrong way to engage Freeman's argument and would reflect a critically missed opportunity. Instead of seeking to dismiss Freeman's argument out of hand, we should be willing to ask what, in certain canonical libertarian writings, could plausibly result in such a reading of libertarianism as fundamentally illiberal. By asking this question, we believe we can improve the presentation of the libertarian position and reassert the essential liberalism of the libertarian project.
The case for the right to private property since the Scottish Enlightenment has rested not only on its normative weight but on the positive consequences for economic development and thus human flourishing which it engenders. An analysis of modern economic growth throughout the world since the early 19th century indicates that those countries with an institutional environment of secure property rights have achieved higher levels of various measures of human well-being, including not only higher GDP per capita and greater political freedom, but also lower infant mortality rates, higher rates of education, greater respect for civil liberties (including religious toleration), improvements in the treatment of women, and longer life-expectancy (see Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall 2015) . Where property rights have been well-defined and enforced, individuals have been able to satisfy their individual wants and desires, both material and nonmaterial, not through violent conflict and theft, but through productive specialization and exchange. Property rights constitute the critical part of the institutional package that enable individuals to realize the gains from social cooperation and to overcome the harsh reality of subsistence existence that had plagued mankind through much of its history (see Boettke and Candela forthcoming) . 4 Freeman rules out classical liberals from this analysis defining the libertarian as one who believes that the state has no legitimate role. In making this statement, we are blending once again classical liberalism with what could be termed radical liberalism and engaging with modern liberalism. All three forms of liberalism, we contend, share a similar goal of peaceful cooperation among diverse individuals and groups and for the economic system to escape from wretched poverty and the tyranny of others over their lives. In our rendering, the radical liberal is essentially an updated classical liberal who on the basis of social science and history is more pessimistic about the constitutional project to constrain public predation, and more optimistic about mediating institutions of civil society to ward off private predation. (see Boettke and Leeson 2015) property rights is antithetical to liberal political institutions. We address Freeman's argument by arguing twofold. First, although he derives a logically valid theory of libertarianism, which indeed has illiberal implications, Freeman's account of libertarianism mistakenly conflates an absolute notion of private property and contract with liberty itself. Second, we argue that private property and freedom of contract are necessary, but not sufficient for a liberal view of libertarianism.
Sufficient for a liberal view of libertarianism is a framework of general and universally applicable rules that exhibit neither discrimination nor dominion over individuals before the law, i.e. liberty.
The right to private property and contract are normatively laden principles, yet contextual and endogenous to a political framework that gives space to exchange and human flourishing.
Ultimately, what Freeman is criticizing is an illiberal view of libertarianism that structures atomistic interaction, one where human interaction is passively based on a logical derivation of the non-aggression axiom. Our account is that libertarianism, properly understood, is a liberal view that structures social interaction, one where human interaction is open-ended and exchange is initiated by individuals' purposive plans.
II. The Freeman Critique of Libertarianism
The political philosophy known today as libertarianism is a 20th century sociological construct that has evolved by historical accident, not a designed philosophical construct independent of the liberal political tradition. (Hart 1979: 828) . While the focus of our chapter is not to focus on this distinction between rights and utility, our point here, and that of Freeman's, is that illiberal readings of libertarianism are unnecessarily based on a defense of individual rights independent of attention to economic consequences as well as to human flourishing (see Boettke 1995) .
Although "high liberals" and libertarians share a respect for individual rights, philosopher Freeman concludes that libertarianism is illiberal because "it is not so much about liberty as it is about protecting and enforcing absolute property and contract rights" (Freeman 2001: 133) .
According to Freeman, "The most characteristic feature of a liberal society is its toleration of beliefs and diverse ways of life. Dissent, nonconformity, and assured space of independence are accepted as normal in social life " (2001: 108) . Ludwig von Mises has also stressed that liberals demand tolerance as a matter of principle since "only tolerance can create and preserve the conditions of social peace without which humanity must relapse into the barbarism and penury of centuries long past" (2005 [1927] : 34). Because liberalism "limits its concerns to earthly life and earthly endeavor" : 33), human beings have neither omniscience nor access to divine truth. Due to our scarcity of knowledge, both of earthly and religious matters, toleration is a competitive means toward the fulfillment of peace. It is a form of competition in which individuals are striving to meet their goals of religious and personal expression, not through violence, but through peaceful cooperation. Liberalism as a political theory cannot achieve peace by eliminating competition; it can only offer institutional solutions that channel human action from forms of competition that are violent and illiberal to those that are peaceful and liberal in nature.
Freeman recognizes that securing the conditions for peaceful cooperation is a common good to all individuals, but "central to the liberal public good is maintaining the civic status of persons as free and as equals. Basic rights are the primary means for securing this status" (2001: 113, fn. 19). Saying that rights are "basic" means that they are both fundamental and inalienable. 
III. Libertarianism Reconsidered
An exhaustive summary of all of Freeman's criticisms of libertarianism is beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to say, for the purposes of building a case for a liberal view of libertarianism that will contrast Freeman's critique later in this chapter, Freeman's argument can be summarized as follows: libertarianism is based on normative claim that individuals ought to have an absolute right to private property and to contract with other individuals so long as they do interfere or violate other individuals' rights. Moreover, an absolute right to private property provides a direct or isomorphic link between morality and legality. As Freeman states, "liberty is property" (2001: 128). Therefore, if the legal system is nothing more than a sum of private contractual relations made amongst individuals, then liberal institutions that uphold individuals "equal rights to basic liberties" have no role in a libertarian order. As long as such transactions are made amongst consenting adults, the enforcement of private property rights are both morally and legally binding, independent of the consequences that follow (Freeman 2001: 133) , including the emergence of slavery and feudalism based on consensual contractual arrangements.
It is important to first point out that the among the libertarians he mentions in his article, such as Robert Nozick, Jan Narveson, Ayn Rand, Murray Rothbard, John Hospers, only Nozick made the claim that an institutional framework of private property may, though not necessarily so, allow an individual to contract themselves voluntarily into slavery:
The comparable question about an individual is whether a free system will allow him to sell himself into slavery. I believe that it would. (Other writers disagree.) It would also allow him permanently to commit himself never to enter into such a transaction (1974: 331 It is indeed the case that the right to private property and the right to contract are both important normative principles among libertarians, in which individuals ought to have the right to be able to acquire, transfer, and dispose things. However, property rights are best understood as "the sanctioned behavioral relations among men that arise from the existence of things and pertain to their use'' (emphasis original, Furubotn and Pejovich 1972: 1139) . To say that property rights are "sanctioned" means that they do not rise ex nihilo from the mental state of an individual; they cannot be understood outside a social context of legal norms, which must be consistent or congruent to the prevailing informal norms and customs of a particular society for them to be wellenforced (Boettke [2001] 1996: 257; see also Boettke, Leeson, and Coyne 2008) .
These legal norms are not to be understood simply as normative principles, but as what Rasmussen and Den Uyl refer to as "metanormative principles", which are "concerned with the creation, interpretation, and justification of a poltical/legal context in which the possibility of the pursuit of flourishing is secured " (2005: 78) . The metanormative principle paramount to liberalism is the basic 6 right to liberty, not the individual right to private property. In other words, the right to liberty is not the right to private property itself; rather, the right to private property is corollary to the right to liberty and arises in a context in which individuals are free to self-direct their lives according to their own purposive plans, but one in which the autonomy to self-direct their lives is in concert with enabling and contributing to the self-direction of others' purposive plans.
Freeman's claim, however, is that libertarianism is a political theory of individual rights "independent of social interaction" (2001: 125). Moreover, he also claims that that "libertarianism assigns far less importance than does liberalism to freedom as individual independence and autonomy, the degree to which people are self-sufficient and can control their options and important aspects of their lives" (2001: 127). However, a liberal view of libertarianism, we argue, is both radically individualized and radically social. In other words, the ethical underpinning of a liberal political framework is not one in which the "the personal, the interpersonal, and the social stand as separate spheres, independently regulated, but as concentric circles of the same figure" (Norton 1976: 241) . To understand how individual autonomy, independence, and the common good are compatible and reinforce one another, we borrow the distinction made by philosopher David Norton between "antecedent and consequent sociality":
Every human being is social in the beginning and social in the end, but the two socialities are radically different in kind in virtue of the intervening attainment to individuality. The first is a received sociality to which the person (as child and adolescent) is responsible; the second is a constituted sociality for which he shares responsibility. The sociality that follows the choice of oneself in no way compromises this choice but extends and fulfills it. It asks for no sacrifice of individuality to the collective interest but exemplifies the principle of the complementarity of true individuals. The normative principles of sociality implicit in principles of self-actualization pertain exclusively to consequent sociality. But consequent sociality should be viewed in developmental context, hence we must sketch the antecedent sociality from which it is emergent (1976: 253-254) .
It is uncontested that in the sphere of human action that social entities have real existence. Nobody ventures to deny that the historical, geographical, and cultural context into which we are born are real factors influencing the course of an individual's life. However, as James Buchanan states in his famous article entitled "Natural and Artifactual Man," "man wants liberty to become the man he wants to become" (1999: 259). Norton also echoes this point that within every human being resides a constellation of human possibilities, one of which must be discovered and actualized by the individual as a unique potentiality (Norton 1976: 248) .
It is in the following ways that a liberal view of libertarianism is both radically individual and radically social. First, individuals are not passive integers within the social; it is not the case that their identities are identical and therefore derive no benefit from social interaction. Second, it does not take the Hobbesian view that individuals are entirely unique and atomistic, and therefore conclude that individuals are self-sufficient and naturally exist independent of social interaction (Machan 1998: 4) . Rather, "every person is a universal-particular; he is both a unique destiny and 'humanity' in the form of the total constellation of human possibilities" (Norton 1976: 248) . This has important implications for how we define the common good, individual independence, and autonomy in contrast to Freeman.
The way in which to distinguish the liberal constitution that Freeman is outlining and that which we are outlining can be framed in terms of the relationship between rights and justice. For in sociality with others. Consequent sociality emerges out of human action but not of human design from this self-discovery process, "and the division of labor within consequent sociality derives not from abstract assignment of integers by an impersonal agency, but from choices by persons according to the unique persons they are" (Norton 1976: 274 (emphasis added, Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986: 138) . The politically fragmented nature of Western Europe was an institutional prerequisite for freedom of competition (Boettke 1993: 108) among alternative governance structures for the development of peaceful cooperation and economic development. Freeman recognizes that the "allocative role of markets is basic precept in all liberal views" (Freeman 2001: 117) , but by casting markets in terms of perfect competition, he underappreciates the role that competition plays as a discovery procedure (Hayek 1978: 179-190) , both in markets as well as in politics.
Whereas Freeman views libertarianism as resembling feudalism and therefore inconsistent
with liberal institutions, we regard the divided structure of feudal governance in Europe as having sowed the seeds of its own destruction, from which liberal institutions would emerge as an unintended consequence of political competition. Given the absence of any centralized political author in Medieval Europe, political leaders competing with each other had to offer more liberties to their subjects, at the expense of their political discretion. Their political privileges to exercise dominion or discrimination over their subjects for their own private ends was increasingly eroded for fear of migration to areas that offered greater political, economic, and religious liberty. Political competition between emerging nation-states in Western Europe set in motion a discovery process that enabled the emergence of a set of political institution which constrained, rather than unleashed, the political privilege and discretion of feudal aristocrats, creating a situation in which laws were increasingly applied impartially to all individuals. Such a discovery process also revealed information about the legitimate role of the state and the level of public services demanded by citizens of a particular jurisdiction.
IV. How Some Libertarians Can Be Read as Illiberal
In the previous section we outlined Freeman' What these two particular authors illustrate is how a particular defense of libertarianism, based on the same premises utilized by Freeman, is a plausible, yet mistaken, understanding of an "institutionless" libertarianism, one that is based on a priori defense of the non-aggression axiom.
As Freeman states, "Libertarians of course deny the institutional conception of property. illustrating an example in which the poor parent of a sick child sells himself into slavery in order to obtain $5 million for their child's cure. Moreover, because "Freeman type liberals" would not allow such a contract to be legally sanctioned, they are not only "heartless" but also "against allowing the mother her self actualization" (2011: 552).
There are two problems with Block's arguments. First, the claim that individuals have both a moral and a legal duty to uphold individual rights, so long as they are entered into voluntarily, runs in direct contradiction to Block's claim that libertarianism is a more encompassing philosophy than liberalism, in the sense that "for the libertarian, any act between consenting adults, sexual, social and even commercial, should be legal. Thus libertarianism in this case accepts the basic premise of liberalism, but applies it far more widely, fully and consistently" (2011: 540). Contrary to his claim, Block's account of libertarianism implicitly narrows, rather than widens, the notion of individual rights into an ethics of non-aggression writ large. Secondly, Block strait jackets himself into an illiberal view of libertarianism by taking the concept of rights outside of the context of liberalism, one in which property rights are a means to achieve peaceful cooperation defined by voluntary exchange and human flourishing. Instead, Block conceives of rights as being derived a priori to uphold peaceful relations but defined by the non-aggression axiom, providing a "litmus test" to distinguish a "pure" libertarianism based on negative liberty from liberalism, which is contaminated by positive liberties.
Distinctions between negative and positive liberties, while conceptually useful, do not perform the clean split that Block wishes to draw. Who cares if we can conceptually distinguish between negative and positive liberties when if sticking to negative liberties we entrap individuals in poverty and eliminate each individual's ability to self-direct their lives? The fact that in many modern libertarian writings, the institutionalization of negative liberties leads to favorable consequences appears as a happy coincidence. But this type of reasoning simply reinforces the artificial split between morality and consequentialism that must be rejected (see Boettke 1995) .
Individual rights must be understood as a link between the ethical order and the legal/political order, not as an "amorphous or direct link" between the two (Rasmussen 1989: 99) .
Rights properly understood set the preconditions for moral activity and human flourishing to take place; they do not determine a one-to-one mapping between what is moral and what is legal (Boettke 2003: 153) . Choices defined by emergency situations, such as the choice between selling one into slavery or condemning one's child to death by illness, are taken out of the context of political and social life. To this point, Rasmussen and Den Uyl elaborate:
Without attempting to determine what the ethically proper course of action would be in such a situation, if there is one, this is a situation in which the flourishing of both parties cannot be attained -social and political life is impossible -and individual rights, the very social and political principles which exist to guarantee the possibility that each and every person might flourish, have no point. Such a situation by its very nature precludes the possibility that both parties will flourish. We may say, then, that when social and political life is not possible, namely, when it is in principle impossible for human beings to live among each other and pursue their well-being, consideration of individual rights are out of place, they do not apply (emphasis original, 1991: 145-146) .
A libertarian order, properly understood as a liberal view, not only sets the institutional preconditions for freedom of choice, but also tolerates the freedom to engage in choices that may be considered immoral but not necessarily legally prohibited just because they are regarded as argues that monarchical rule would be preferable to democratic rule because a democratically elected official "is a temporary caretaker and thus tries to maximize current government income of all sorts at the expense of capital values, and thus wastes." In addition, democracy has diminished the position of "natural elites" from their positions of natural authority that they had before the democratic age (Hoppe 2006 From a logical point of view, Hoppe's conception of the relationship between free trade, migration, and private property represents a "litmus test libertarianism" that demonstrates the pure logic and the starting point of analysis for understanding a libertarian world in order to distinguish it from an "impure" notion of libertarianism. For example, Hoppe regards the "relationship between trade and migration is one elastic substitutability (rather than rigid exclusivity): the more (or less) you have of one, the less (or more) you need of the other " (1998: 224) . By this logic, if there are lower transaction costs of trading goods and services, then there will be less incentive for individuals to migrate from low-wage to high-wage areas, such as between Mexico and the U.S.
In addition, the smaller the quantity of public property, the less acute he problem of immigration.
However, "as long as there exists any public property, it cannot be entirely escaped" (Hoppe 1998: 230) . Following the logic of the Coase Theorem (1960), if property rights are well-defined and transactions costs are insignificant, private bargaining between individuals will generate an efficient allocation of resources independent of the initial assignment of property rights (Coase 1960 
V. Conclusion
In this chapter we have developed the case for a liberal view of libertarianism. We have attempted to do so by engaging two claims Freeman has made about an illiberal view of libertarianism. First, that people possess absolute right to private property independent of social interaction and, secondly, that libertarianism neglects the importance of individual independence and autonomy.
While liberty is a concept that is generally regarded as negative, as Hayek states, "[t] his is true in the sense that peace is also a negative concept". However Rather, it takes peaceful cooperation as its unifying principle and utilizes freedom of competition to discover those institutional arrangements most conducive to peaceful cooperation under the division labor.
